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THE STATUS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
ANCIENT, ISLAMIC AND MEDIEVAL LATIN CONTEXTS
Jens Høyrup
As all contributors to the present volume know, Laura Toti Rigatelli has worked in in various
fields within the history of mathematics. However, my own working catalogue, my bookshelves
and my archive indicate clearly that what has affected me most is her work on the late medieval
and Renaissance Italian practitioners’ abbaco tradition. My homage to her will therefore deal
with the status of practitioners’ knowledge.
It is to a large extent to the credit of Laura Toti Rigatelli (together with Raffaella Franci
and Gino Arrighi) that interest in practical mathematics is not uncommon within Italian
historiography of mathematics. In the perspective of the global community of historians of
mathematics, however, things appear to look different; here, work on theoretical knowledge
by far overshadows that on the knowledge of pratitioners. Moreover, since the knowledge of
specialists’ crafts is generally considered of scarce interest, it is largely overlooked that it was
largely independent of what we are accustomed to see as contemporary “scientific knowledge”,
at least during the pre-Modern epoch and to some extent even later, but that it is none the less
not to be understood as mere and general “folk knowledge”.
As Laura Toti Rigatelli I have mainly approached the relationship between the two types
and organizations of knowledge from the point of view of mathematics, which is the field I
know best [Høyrup 1990; 1997a]. This may be claimed to have distorted my view, since a corpus
of knowledge as coherent as that of “scientific” (Euclidean, Archimedean, etc.) mathematics
is not found in other fields in the pre-Modern world. Scientific mathematics can be argued to
have taken over material and inspiration from the practical traditions and to have digested it
in such a way that wholly new structures emerged; In other fields, “philosophers” made
common-sense use within their own framework of every-day observations or of knowledge
deriving from the practical traditions – but they did not transform this borrowed knowledge
radically.
This may to a large extent be true.1 I shall argue, however, that it is not always true; I
will also claim that the case of mathematics reveals tendencies which are everywhere present
by have not crystallized as clearly in other domains as in the case of mathematics.
In [1987] I tried to launch the concept of an “Islamic miracle”, a counterpart of its better-
known “Greek” namesake. While the “Greek miracle” consists, briefly spoken, in the discovery
of autonomous knowledge as a possibility, its “Islamic” counterpart is (ideally speaking) the
discovery that no practice is too mean to serve as a starting point for theoretical reflection, and
no theory too lofty to be applied in practice – a discovery which in the European and particularly
1 It can even be seen to be true when mathematically less competent ancient philosophers like Plutarch
and Iamblichos (mentioned as embodiments of the whole neopythagorean current) appropriated part of
practical arithmetical knowledge – cf. [Høyrup 2000].
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the British tradition is mostly referred to Francis Bacon.2
In what follows I shall try to convey some of the insights into the diverse (not to say
divergent) approaches to knowledge in the Ancient, Medieval Islamic and Medieval Latin world
which I believe to have gained from this work – presenting first some examples of contrasting
ways in which different cultures have approached same subject-matter, and drawing afterwards
some general conclusions.
Examples in contrast
The first example comes from basic geometrical construction. It is the question, how to draw
a straight line.
In a way, this is the topic of Postulate 1 of the Elements [trans. Heath 1926: I, 154], according
to which it is possible “to draw a straight line from any point to any point”. The Greek verbal
form, however, is a perfect infinitive αγαγειν. As pointed out by Marinus Taisbak [1992: 144],
this linguistic peculiarity is all-pervasive in the Elements (and the Data): lines are always drawn,
points taken, and perpendiculars dropped in the perfect imperative passive; in Taisbak’s words,
actual drawing is taken care of by an ever-present “Helping Hand”. The actual performance
of the act does not concern the geometer.
In contrast, Chapter I of Abu¯’l-Wafa ’s Book on What is Necessary for Artisans in Geometrical
Construction starts as follows [Russian trans. Krasnova 1966: 56f]:
Know that the correctness or incorrectness of a construction depends on three things: The ruler, the
compass, and the try square.
The most important of these is the ruler. That is, a straight line without bend. As Archimedes
said, it is the shortest line that connects two points, for example the points A and B and reversely
[reference to a drawing in the treatise]. If from one of them to the other several lines are drawn, for
example the line ACB, ADB and AEB, then the shortest of these ist the straight line, namely the line
ACB [straight in the drawing]. Therefore, if we have a ruler and its edge lays along a straight line,
then the ruler in question is correct. Such rulers are used for short straights and lines. But if the straight
or the line is long, then ropes are used.
A ruler is corrected by grinding. If the one which we need to correct is very long, then it is split
into several ropes which are then corrected by grinding. If we want to correct a ruler we must first
of all smooth its edge if it is made of any hard material, be it iron or copper or anything similar;
or level it with an axe, if it is made of wood, and then correct it by grinding. If we have finished
the correction of the ruler and want to find out afterwards whether we have performed the correction
properly, then we put it in an even place and mark the position of its straight edge, and then
interchange the places of its ends and again mark the position of its straight edge. If these two straights
coincide, then the ruler is correct, if however they do not coincide, then we know in which place
there is a bend, since it is in the place where the two straights deviate and do not coincide.
Most artisans control the correctness of a ruler visually. When we look from one end to the
other, then it is obvious in which place it deviates upwards, and in which downwards. This happens
because of the straightness of the light ray.
One might of course be tempted to explain (that is, explain away) the difference in perspective
from the diversity of the audiences for which the two texts were written. In order to test this
2 Knowing well the writings of Renaissance artists, experimentalists and engineers, Paolo Rossi [1970: 101
and passim] is quite aware that these made similar claims long before Bacon. Even in his reading of the
record, however, Bacon is the figure who symbolizes the acceptance of the view within philosophy.
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explanation we may look at the way theoretical insights appear in Hero’s Metrica.
Metrica deals with mensurational computation and not with construction, it is true, and
therefore does not discuss the drawing of lines; but its way to integrate theoretical results into
a practical handbook remains informative regarding the way it understands that integration
of theory and practice which is the project.
I shall not go through the argument in detail, as I have done that elsewhere [Høyrup 1997b],
but only repeat the conclusions which can be drawn on the basis of the way “Hero’s formula”
and the Archimedean approximation to a flat circular segment occur in the text:
Hero uses a pre-existing practical handbook rooted in the practitioners’, not the Euclidean
tradition, and within each main chapter he follows its order section for section;3 if the contents
of a specific section seems unsatisfactory, however, he replaces it with something borrowed
from theoretical geometry (e.g., the extended Pythagorean theorem instead of the computation
of the projections of triangular sides by means of quasi-algebraic methods); he inserts extra
chapters when he thinks that some formula not covered in the original should be included,
and provides them with the necessary lemmata; but he does not smooth the text and does not
care about the coherence between the “theoretically based” parts of the text and the rest; thus
he will argue within of one of the “theoretically based” insertions that a particular formula
should not be used when the base of a circular segment is more than thrice the arrow,– only
to use the very same formula in the next “practitioner-based” chapter in the case where the
ratio is 4.
This work, we should remember, is the best surviving attempt from Greek antiquity to
make something of the same kind as Abu¯’l-Wafa¯ ’s work; when at all using material of
“scientific” extraction, the pseudo-Heronian conglomerates Geometrica and De mensuris are even
less oriented toward integration of the theoretical and the practical perspective. Even when
really trying to accomplish something similar to what Abu¯’l-Wafa¯ was eventually to achieve,
no mathematical writer in Antiquity was really able to do so. As soon as it was present,
theoretical mathematics impressed upon the writer a concern for metatheoretical pureness that
prevented genuine integration. Once more, Hero may serve as an example. When transferring
“Hero’s formula” from the practically oriented treatise on the Dioptra to the Metrica,4 two
characteristic changes are made. Firstly, a lemma is added according to which the “side” of
a rectangle5 whose sides are the squares on lines ΑΒ and ΒΓ is equal to the rectangle contained
by ΑΒ and ΒΓ; this theorem, used as practical and self-evident knowledge already in the Old
Babylonian problem BM 13901 no. 12, is taken for granted in the Dioptra. Secondly, the sides
which in the numerical example of the Dioptra are 12, 13 and 15 parts or shares (µοιραι) become
12, 13 and 15 times unity (12, 13 and 15 µοναδες).
3 The order of the main chapters, on the other hand, is likely to be changed in at least one case: Hero deals
with triangles before trapezia and irregular quadrangles, whereas treatises close to the practical tradition
treat of quadrangles in general before triangles, at least outside the Greek orbit; it is not to be seen, however,
whether Hero himself or the Greek handbook which he uses is responsible for the inversion.
4 That this is what happens (unless Hero borrows for the Metrica from an original from which he copies
even more directly in the Dioptra) is argued in [Høyrup 1997b].
5 That is, the side of its area when it is laid out as a square; in numbers, which is probably what Hero
intends, its square root.
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The second example has to do with the way theoreticians deal with sub-scientific recreational
mathematics. In Arithmetica I.22, [ed. Tannery 1893: 50–52] Diophantos asks for three numbers
which fulfil the condition that if to each of them a given part of the sum of the others is added,
the same sum arises in all cases. There is no doubt that this is an undressed version of the
“purchase of a horse”, to which already Plato seems to refer in book I of the Republic [333b-c,
ed., trans. Shorey 1930: I, 332f]: Three men go to the market in order to buy a horse; the first
asks for (e.g.) half of the possessions of the others, which will enable him to buy the horse; the
second asks for one third; and the third is satisfied by a mere fourth. But Diophantos transforms
the problem into a pure-number problem without hinting in any way at its origin as a riddle.
Another recreational problem which was no less popular during the Middle Ages and which
was probably also known in Classical Antiquity [Christianidis 1991] is “the hundred fowls” –
how to buy one hundred fowls for one hundred monetary units, given that (e.g.) a goose costs
3 dinars and a hen 2 dinars, chickens being sold one dinar each three. In his Book of Rare Things
in Calculation, Abu¯ Ka¯mil submits this indeterminate problem to a comprehensive mathematical
treatment, finding the complete set of solutions; at first, however, he tells [German trans. Suter
1910a: 100] that he is going to treat
a particular type of calculation, circulating among high-ranking and lowly people, among scholars
and among the uneducated, at which they rejoice, and which they find new and beautiful; one asks
the other, and he is then given an approximate and only assumed answer, they known neither
principle nor rule in the matter.
It is obvious from the wording that Abu¯ Ka¯mil the scientific mathematician does not approve
of such non-scientific manners. But he recognizes the existence of the sub-scientific approach,
confronts it, and makes clear that he is taking up one of its favourite problems and submitting
it to what he would consider a genuine mathematical treatment.6
A third example is offered by the divergent approaches to computation in astronomy.
The preface to book III of the Almagest [ed., German trans. Manitius 1912: I, 130] states
that books I and II have explained the absolutely indispensable mathematical preliminaries for
knowing about the Earth and the Heavens. As it was pointed out by Olaf Pedersen [1974: 32f],
this means that logistics, the actual computations leading from the theorems of spherical
trigonometry (theorems which are dutifully explained because they are not in the Elements)
to the values of the chords in the chord table of I.11 are not counted as part of mathematics,
not even as some kind of related field which in the likeness of mathematics asks for proof.
Also in a preface – namely to the Book on finding the Chords in the Circle ... [German trans.
Suter 1910b: 11f] – , al-Bı¯ru¯nı¯ states that
You know well, God give you strength, for which reason I began searching for a number of
demonstrations proving a statement due to the ancient Greeks concerning the division of the broken
line in an arbitrary circular arc by means of the perpendicular from its centre, and which passion
I felt for the subject [...], so that you reproached [?] me my preoccupation with these chapters of
geometry, not knowing the true essence of these subjects, which consists precisely in going in each
matter beyond what is necessary. If you would only, God give you strength, observe the aims of
6 Much more than such recognition is found in Qusta ibn Lu¯qa¯’s Treatise on the Proof of the Method of the
Double False Position [ed. Suter 1908]. Qusta¯ offers geometric proofs of the correctness of the method, which
he explicitly tells to belong to the “art of reckoning”. Similar examples abound.
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geometry, which consist in determining the mutual relation between its magnitudes with regard to
quantity, and [if you would only observe] that it is in this way that one reaches knowledge of the
magnitudes of all things measurable and ponderable found between the centre of the world and the
ultimate limits of perception through the senses. And if you would only know that by them [the
geometrical magnitudes] are meant the [mere] forms, detached from matter [...]. Whatever way [the
geometer] may go, through exercise will he be lifted from the physical to the divine teachings, which
are little accessible because of the difficulty to understand their meaning, because of the subtlety of
their methods and the majesty of their subject, and because of the circumstance that not everybody
is able to have a conception of them, especially not the one who turns away from the art of
demonstration. You would be right, Good give you strength, to reproach me, had I neglected to search
for these ways [methods], and used my time where an easier approach would suffice; of if the work
had not arrived at the point which constitutes the fundament of astronomy, that is to the calculation
of the chords in the circle and the ratio of their magnitude to that supposed for the diameter [...].
Only in God the Almighty and All-wise is relief!
The first part of the process – “determining the mutual relation between its magnitudes with
regard to quantity, [namely geometrical magnitudes which are understood as mere] forms,
detached from matter” – this sounds rather Greek, though more tainted by Greek philosophy
than by what is found in explicit words in Greek mathematics. The second part of the process,
however, the application to trigonometric computation, is precisely the step in the process which
disappears from view in Ptolemy, as does the actual drawing of the line. What al-Bı¯ru¯nı¯ does
here is, so to speak, to follow Plato’s rule from the Republic: that the philosophers who have
seen the heavenly light should redescend into the cave to make their insight serve – a rule which
the mathematicians of Plato’s own cultural orbit were unable or unwilling to comply with.
So far we have moved within the orbit of the exact sciences and only looked at classical antiquity
and the Islamic Middle Ages. Similar contrasts turn up in the fourth and final example, which
goes to the other end of the spectrum of knowledge and regards the complex of political and
economical thought, and which will also give us the occasion to include Latin Europe in the
discussion.
Book I of Aristotle’s Politica consists of economic theory, if economy is taken in its original
sense of oiko-nomia, “household science”. The book is a reflection on theoretical problems: the
composition of the polis from households, the two-fold composition of the household from male
and female and from master and slave; the respective roles of household, village and polis for
satisfying human needs; the legitimacy of slavery; the distinction between “unnatural” and
“natural” property acquisition (the former connected to the invention of coined money and
to the possibilities of unlimited accumulation for its own sake that follows from this invention,
the latter concerned with the fruits of the earth and animals); the relation between the various
kinds of persons involved in the household; and the importance of virtue.
The existence of practical advice and of common-sense anecdotes on gaining wealth is
mentioned in chapter 11 – for instance the anecdote on Thales’s corner on oil-mills. Such explicit
and implicit practical advice, however, is clearly understood [1258b39–1259a6, trans. Jowett 1921]
as belonging to another genre than Aristotle’s own treatise, a genre that includes
works [...] written upon these subjects by various persons; for example, by Chares the Parian, and
Apollodorus the Lemnian, who have treated of Tillage and Planting, while others have treated of
other branches [...]. It would be well to collect the scattered stories of the ways in which individuals
have succeeded in amassing a fortune; for all this is useful to persons who value the art of getting
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wealth.
The treatises of Chares and Apollodoros are evidently of the same kind as Columella’s De re
rustica (though shorter), i.e., as deficient when it comes to theory as Politica is lacking in practical
advice.
Book I of the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomica does combine two kinds of knowledge, but
not theory and real practical advice.7 E. S. Forster describes it instead as containing “elements
derived from Aristotle, but it also owes a good deal to the Oeconomicus of Xenophon”. The latter
work thus seems to represent the kind of “practical” knowledge the followers of Aristotle thought
it would be adequate for a gentleman to possess.
Xenophon’s approach does not differ much in tone and intellectual level from that other
famous conservative gentleman’s advice for marriage, “tak’em young and treat’em rough”; no
genuine interest in practical problems is to be expected, we might say, in a work based on the
opinion that “the illiberal arts, as they are called, are spoken against, and are, naturally enough,
held in utter disdain in our states” [iv.2, trans. Marchant 1923: 391], and which claims that what
it presents is indeed an εpiιστηµη, a “science”, no art – and at that the science best fit for
gentlemen who at all costs should keep aloof of illiberal arts [vi.2–8, ibid. p. 409]. Whatever
practical advice comes in the end is commonsensical and not the kind of knowledge which the
good overseer should possess. It is stated quite explicitly that technical progress is of no use:
“It is not the farmers reputed to have made some clever discovery in agriculture who differ
in fortune from others: it is things of this sort [i.e., taking trouble to see what is sown or
manured, taking trouble to plant wines, etc.] that make all the difference” [xx.5, ibid. p. 511];
but this all-important care then receives no closer description.8
An obvious contrast to this juxtaposition of theory and banality parading as practical advice
is offered by an Arabic handbook on “commercial science” written by one Šaykh Abu¯’l-Fadl
Ja far ibn Ali al-Dimišqı¯ somewhere between 870 and 1174 CE. This treatise combines general
economic theory (about the distinction between monetary, movable and fixed property, more
elaborate than Aristotle’s conceptual distinctions but on the same lines) and Greek political theory
with systematic description of various types of goods and with (really) good advice on prudent
trade9.
Around 1240, finally, Robert Grosseteste – certainly better versed than most of his
contemporaries in philosophical writing – prepared or supervised the preparation of a set of
Rules on How to Guard and Govern Land and Households. The view of the scholar-bishop on how
a handbook for practice should be written is not to be mistaken: philosophical doctrines have
no role to play, neither as adornment nor as an integrative part of the exposition. The rules
are real practical rules, not cant in the manner of a Xenophon. They come close to De re rustica
7 Book II, mainly a collection of anecdotes, is from a different hand and a different epoch. Book I, on the
other hand, seems to have been produced in the Peripatetic school not long after Aristotle’s own times –
see [Forster 1921, preface].
8 Certainly not because Xenophon did not possess or appreciate the importance of such cunning – how
else should have he have been able to lead the army of the “Ten Thousand” successfully through vast
unknown regions to the sea, and how should he have been able to make a career as a mercenary general
in territories with no particular feeling for Greek cultural values?
9 A discussion and a partial translation of the treatise is given by Hellmut Ritter [1916].
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and probably to the works of a Chares and an Apollodoros [trans. Oschinsky 1971: 391–395]:
[In order to ascertain whether you can live throughout the year off your demesne lands,] command
emphatically that in each place, when the corn is brought in, the twentieth sheaf of each kind of corn
is thrown aside as it enters the grange and is threshed and measured by itself; and based on this
measure you can estimate all the other corn in the grange. And when this is being done I advise
you to send to the best manors among your lands those men from your household in whom you
have the greatest trust so that they be present at harvest time when the corn is brought in and there
supervise this operation. And if this does not please you use this method: Command your steward
that he arranges for knowledgeable and loyal men to estimate every year at Michaelmas all the stacks,
within and without the grange, of each kind of corn; how many quarters there ought to be, and how
many quarters in seed-corn and in liveries of corn to servants the soil will take back [...].
No doubt about it, these are stratagems actually used by clever stewards,– stratagems in which
(ps.-)Grosseteste advises the landowner to instruct less clever or less experienced stewards.
Overall observations
Since Dilthey, the reasons for the lacking integration of philosophy with technical-practical
cognition in the Greek world has been discussed with reference to “the opposition of a ruling
citizenry, which also cultivated science, to the slave class on which the burden of manual labor
fell, and, connected with that, disdain for physical labor”, and to “the lack of an industry
managed by scientifically trained people” [Dilthey 1988: 203].
Such explanations, however plausible when seen in the perspective of an epoch where “an
industry managed by scientifically trained people” has become a matter of course, were evidently
invisible to the actors themselves, according to whom the illiberal arts were, “naturally enough,
held in utter disdain”. But the resulting attitude – however much a “rationalization” in the
Freudian sense – is formulated with perspicacity by Aristotle in the Metaphysics [981b14-982a1,
trans. Ross 1928]:
At first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was
naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions, but because
he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed
to the necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded
as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility.
Hence when all such inventions were already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving
pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, [...]
So [...], the theoretical kinds of knowledge [are thought] to be more of the nature of Wisdom
than the productive.
The discovery of the “sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life”,
i.e., of the possibility to pursue autonomous knowledge, is what constitutes the illustrious “Greek
miracle”; but although writers with a broader outlook than Xenophon – a Plato, an Aristotle –
did not stop at contempt, Greek and Hellenistic antiquity in general tended to hypostatize the
autonomy of theoretical knowledge; even the practical underpinnings of theoretical investigations
like the drawing of lines are excluded from view and only enter the scene by way of their out-
comes.10 Attempts to apply theoretical knowledge in order to improve upon technical practice
10 Evidently, this concerns what went into written treatises – nobody doubts that Greek geometers made
their own drawings. Nor will anybody deny the technical feats of Greek and Roman antiquity – as David
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were liable to produce incoherent eclecticism like the Heronian Metrica, or to impress irrelevant
schemes like the humoral theory on a medical techne which without this borrowing from fully
developed natural philosophy was more “scientific” in Baconian and probably even in modern
terms.11 As summed up by Benjamin Farrington [1969: 302] (no less a Baconian than a Marxist),
it was not
only with Ptolemy and Galen that the ancients stood on the threshold of the modern world. By that
late date they had already been loitering on the threshold for four hundred years. They had indeed
demonstrated conclusively their inability to cross it.
It is a commonplace that the contempt for practical – and even manual – labour became
much less outspoken in Latin Western Europe. Often the ideological influence of Christianity
(embodied in the Rule of St. Benedict) is seen as the cause for this change; one might suggest
that a social situation where the carriers of high literate culture were forced to act themselves
as overseers both regarding their own affairs and in the affairs of the state may well have shaped
Christian ideology quite as much as Christian ideology – after all still in the crucible – acted
as an independent force. This would hold in the Early and Central Middle Ages, where monks
were forced to manage their own monastic economy and control their own serfs directly, and
where Charlemagne had to use the bishops as administrators of the Empire. But it is obvious
that Grosseteste’s situation was not much different – if he did not have to act directly as an
overseer he had at least to guide his steward. He knew, furthermore, that the steward had no
use for philosophy but rather for organized common sense and the experience of colleagues
and predecessors; Aristotle’s observations in another passage from the Metaphysics (981a13–23,
slightly earlier than the above quotation [trans. Ross 1928]) still held good:
With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed
even better than those who have theory without experience. (The reason is that experience is
knowledge of individuals, art of universals, and actions and production are all concerned with the
individual; for the physician does not cure man, except in an incidental way, but Callias and Socrates
or some other called by some other individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has
the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal but does not know the individual
included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual that is to be cured.)
Scholastics like Grosseteste hence recognized the legitimacy of practical knowledge; since
they knew Aristotle much better than Xenophon, this valuation was not even likely to cause
King once remarked in a discussion of the topic, the Antikythera mechanism [see Price 1974] is another
“Greek miracle”, to which one may add that the logistics of Alexander’s conquests bears witness of a high
level of practical economical thought, much more sophisticated than what the soldier and former general
Xenophon puts into writing.
Yet what is put into writing and what not reflects very well what the culturally hegemonic stratum
finds it suitable to think. However oblique their relation to actual practice, Greek (and Islamic and Medieval
Latin) writing remains an adequate gauge of prevailing attitudes to the relation between different types
of knowledge.
11 No doubt skilled physicians were able to formulate empirically gained insights within the humoral
framework; if that had not been the case, even the most skilful strategies of the medical professions would
not have been sufficient to make the theory survive into the nineteenth century CE. But the basic theoretical
framework itself remains a purely speculative (Latin/English translation of theoretical!) calque from the
doctrine of the four elements.
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them any major trouble; but they had no incentive to produce a genuine integration for which
their theory was not really fit; when they tried, the result turned out [Beaujouan 1957: 20] to
be characterized by
une recherche trop systématique de l’utilité immédiate et par un attachement trop servile aux données
du sens commun
– “trop” at least with regard to our aspiration to reach the birth of modern science, but perhaps
not in relation to the practical concerns of the day, since these were not likely to be adequately
served by much of the theory at hand.
Attempts to achieve genuine integration are only found in the Islamic world as it unfolded in
the ninth through twelfth centuries CE (the situation during the ensuing period, characterized
by what A. I. Sabra [1987: 240] labels “naturalization”, is different and should probably be
investigated in other terms). Abu¯’l-Wafa¯ ’s recognition of the legitimacy of the practical perspec-
tive coupled to awareness of the potentialities of adapted theory within the practical context
is characteristic, and also reflected in the text on commercial science and in the innovative use
of natural philosophy in the medical writings of al-Razı¯ and ibn Sı¯na¯. The above quotation from
al-Bı¯ru¯nı¯ shows the underlying attitude: systematic thought is obliged to strive for the highest
theoretical insight, but also to “return to the cave”. At an earlier occasion [Høyrup 1987: 300ff]
I have pointed to the parallel between this attitude and the religious base of the Islamic culture:
Alla¯h, supremely transcendental, is still Providence caring for the smallest details, and much
more so than the Christian God(s), who had delegated much of his/their care for everyday
to the Virgin and the saints.12 As long as the inherent fundamentalism of Islam was not
controlled by a priesthood, it was possible for an al-Bı¯ru¯nı¯ to judge for himself how his service
to the divine order was to be made, and for a geometer to decide that his service was the
mathematical determination of the direction of prayer irrespective of the fact that religious
scholars had their own ways13 and did not care about spherical geometry.
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